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ライシャワーの沖縄本土返還秘密交渉
Reischauer’s Secret Behind-the-Scenes Negotiations 
on the Reversion of Okinawa to Japan  
御手洗　昭　治
Abstract
　Edwin O. Reischauer， a visionary historian and futurist at Harvard， has best 
been known as former U.S. Ambassador to Japan under the Kennedy administration. 
People at large maintain that from the earliest days when the Japanese and East Asian 
programs began， his insights about how society behaves when too much change 
happens too quickly helps to guide our new direction for Social Science fields---assisting 
people to adapt to change and remove fear is key if we are to advance as a society. 
However， one part which has not been known about Reischauer is the fact that he 
played an initial and a pivotal role so far as the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese 
mainland is concerned. 
　Reischauer sensed in 1961 that a Japanese demand for the return of the Ryukyu 
Islands， including Okinawa， with its population of a little more than a million，could 
easily become an explosive rallying cry for Japanese nationalists.  The island had been 
Japanese territory since 1879. In April 1962,President Kennedy finally made clear that 
Okinawa would someday be returned to Japan in the time the Chief Executive was 
to be elected and there was to be an American civilian， rather than military， Civil 
Administrator. 
　This article explores，in a cursory fashion，the circumstances under which 
negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan took place and got under way 
through Reischauer’s hidden role as a cross-cultural negotiator.　His assiduous 
negotiation efforts and swift moves towards conflicting issues of the eversion of 
Okinawa to Japan was paid off， and Okinawa， as a new prefecture， returned to Japan 
on May 15,1972. 
〈論文〉
　1



























1960 年代から 1970 年代の外交交渉のメモランダム（覚書）、E.O. ライシャワー個人が残







































ところで、国際政治学者であった高坂正尭によれば、１年前の 1950 年 11 月 21 日には、
通産省が日本と琉球の貿易協定細目を発表し、12 月５日には連合国軍総司令部（GHQ）
のダグラス・マッカーサー元帥と朝鮮問題を協議するためコリンズ陸軍参謀総長が来日














　Reischauer saw in 1961 that a Japanese demand for the return of the Ryukyu 
Islands, including Okinawa, with its population of a little more than a million, could 
easily become an explosive rallying cry for Japanese nationalists.  The island had been 
Japanese territory since 1879.  In a joint communique on June 21, 1957, the United 
States reaffirmed that Japan had “residual sovereignty”over the Ryukyus, but added, “so 
long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East, the United States will 
find it necessary to continue the present status”．Reischauer, without any authorization 
from Washington, launched his own campaign to convince top U.S. military commanders 





























































　Walt Lippmann issued “a stern warning concerning America’s policies in the Far 
East.”“The cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit to Japan, and  his embarrassing 



























若泉敬との間で準備された。11 月 19 日、日米両首脳の名前で署名されている。
５．ライシャワーの対人関係力と交渉行動
カーター政権（民主党）とレーガン政権下（共和党）で、戦後第９代目の駐日米国大使
（1977 ～ 1988 年）を務めたマイク・マンスフィールドは、「ライシャワーこそアメリカが
各地に派遣した大使の中で最も偉大な大使だった」と語ったことがある。


















　It was not self-evident that a Harvard professor and carrier military officers would 
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hit it off the way Reischauer did with General Smart and Preston.  When I asked him 
how he managed to do this, his immediate response was: “I’ve always been able to 
get along with anybody, businessmen, military men, whatever. It’s because of my 
insecurity.  No show of arrogance. Possibly my beginning in Japan and having to come 
back and adjust to America and be like the other boys…. I wanted to blend in. It’s the 


















　On February 10, four days after the Waseda incident, Reischauer briefed Robert 
Kennedy on the need to push the military toward greater autonomy for Okinawa 
and its eventual reversion to Okinawa.  Kennedy took notes and conveyed these 
ideas directly to the president.  This was the start of Reischauer’s real influence in 




using it to plan for a visit by the president to Japan. In fact, a high-level team was on its 
way from Washington to Tokyo to plan such a visit when Kennedy was shot in Dallas 
on November 22, 1963. The visit would have taken place in January 1964. In January 
1964, Bobby Kennedy made another visit to Tokyo, less than two months after his 
brother’s death.  He ostensibly came to meet again with President Sukaruno, but the 







































　In March 1962, a month after Reischauer first briefed Bobby［Rober］Kennedy on 
the desirability of returning Okinawa to Japan, President Kennedy took the first step by 
making clear that the Ryukyus would someday be returned to Japan.  The statement 
promised cooperation with the Japanese government in developing the Ryukyus and 
a continuous effort to transfer authority and responsibility to the Ryukyuans. An 
American civilian would replace the military as civil administrator. General Caraway, 
however, flouted Kennedy’s policy.（9,pp.193-194）   
　In April 1962, President Kennedy finally made clear that Okinawa would someday 
be returned to Japan in the meantime the Chief Executive was to be elected and there 


















　Delegations often came to see me to express their views. Periodically President 
Ohama Nobumoto, long the head of Waseda University and Okinawa’s most 
distinguished native son, would lead groups of fellow Okinawans to see me, and the 













　In April 1962, President Kennedy finally made clear that Okinawa would 
someday be returned to Japan and in the meantime the Chief Executive was to 
be elected and there was to be an American civilian, rather than military, Civilian 
Administrator. George McCune’s younger brother, Shannon, a professor of geography 
was chosen, for the position, but found himself completely frustrated by Caraway’s
virtually ignoring him. Caraway also continued to keep Japanese aid to Okinawa and 
consultations as restricted as possible and limited to uninteresting fields, such as harbor 
construction, rather than social problems. And open clash over the aid budget took 
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place in 1963, which came to a head in a flurry of telegrams in the middle of the night 
between Washinton,Tokyo and Okinawa. It was immediately resolved in our favor by 













それに沖縄の基地の在り方と日本政府の非核三原則についての説明を行った。（EOR Secret 1965 
Memo）（ライシャワー秘密文書メモ /Secret 1965 Memo of Reischauer）
　In looking　into Reischauer’s Secret Memo in 1965, it reveals plans for keeping U.S. 
bases and nuclear weapons options in Okinawa after reversion of Okinawa to Japan.
　A meeting of high-level U.S. military and civilian officials was held at the American 
Embassy in Tokyo on July 16.  At the meeting Ambassador Reischauer presented 
the framework for the Japanese government’s betrayal of Okinawan aspirations and 
Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in the 1969 Revision Agreement.
　Steve Rabson, a political scientist at Brown University, spells out that Reischauer, 
at the meeting, offered a post-reversion U.S. strategy for a permanent American 
presence in Okinawa including an option to introduce nuclear weapons. According to 
a declassified Memorandum of Conversation, “Ambassador Reischauer said［that］ 
if Japan would accept nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, including Okinawa, and if it 
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would provide us with assurances guaranteeing our military commanders effective 
control of the islands in time of military crisis, then we would be able to keep our bases 
on the islands, even though‘full sovereignty’reverted to Japan.”These provisions 
later became key elements in post-reversion policy which was negotiated in 1969.（10.,51-1-
10,Feb.1.2010）
　Although U. S. - Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement was to effect on May 15, 
1972, Reischauer’s views expressed in the 1965 are at odds with his public description 
of meetings on reversion which he held with Japanese government officials. Reischauer 
at that time mentioned “on more than one occasion I had told Japanese officials［that］ I 
believed the United States would comply on terms acceptable to Japan, which meant all 
nuclear weapons removed, as in the American military installations in Japan.”（２）
　Additionally, the 1965 memo writes that Reischauer expressed concern that 
a “nationalistic reaction of the Japanese and Ryukyuans has been exacerbated by 
developments in Viet-Nam.” In his autobiography he stressed that “by this time we 
had become so deeply enmeshed [in Vietnam］ that I was ready to accept the [Johnson］ 
administration’s argument that the quickest and easiest way to end the war was to 
force North Vietnam by military might to desist from trying to conquer the South.（9,p.320）
　Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander of U.S. Pacific forces maintained a 
notion “without Okinawa, we cannot carry on the Vietnam war（Command interviews, 
April 1975 and collected in the U.S. Army War College archives, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 
by S. Rabson） .（11） 
　Thus, Reischauer proposed an increase in American aid, revision of the Price Ac 
to increase compensation for owners of land the U.S. had seized for base construction, 
and a loosening of the ban on flying the Japanese flag. It is a tall order to measure 
Reischauer’s influence at that time in the middle 1960s.’  However, all three of these 
recommendations later became American policy. The U.S. Army was not quite happy 
about Reischauer’s advocacy of early reversion plans and they were up against him. 
But the kind of reversion schemes Reischauer advocated was far from what the 
Japanese government later promised Okinawans.
　In view of the 1965 memo, when Army Secretary Stanley asked him if he had 
in his mind a new treaty with Japan placing Okinawa outside the limitations of the 
Constitution, Reischauer replied “something like that would be necessary in spite of 
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the fact that there is no explicit prohibitions of the Constitution”.“Something like that” 
anticipates the 1969 Reversion Agreement making the U.S. military presence more or 
less permanent and maintaining the alternative to introduce nuclear weapons. The term 
“introduce” later created a good deal of commotion between the two countries. For 
instance, at U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons routinely cited ports in Tokyo, 
with the tacit approval of the Japanese government violating the Liberal Democratic 
Party’s off-stated “three non-nuclear principles” prohibiting their manufacture, 
possession, and of introduction. 
　American policies Reischauer recommended for Okinawa were continued after 
reversion by the Japanese government, with Japan paying the bills. The missions of 
U.S. bases in Japan and especially Okinawa, have been less about defending Japan than 
projecting military power and reconnaissance capabilities elsewhere. This was apparent 
that during the Vietnam War when troops trained and deployed in Okinawa to the war 
zone—when long-range bombers flew out of air bases, and when islands served as a 
major site for GIs on R & R from the war zone. Today Okinawa is still a very important 
venue not only for troops training and deploying for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
middle East, but also for keeping an eye wide open for Chinese military vessels moving 
closer to Senkaku island and Okinawa areas.（11） （The Army War College archives 






















電報 1966 年６月 26 日）
　…Instead of resisting most government of Japan efforts to play a larger role in the 
Ryukyus, the United States should avail itself of the Japanese government’s assistance 
in dealing with Ryukyuan problems, realizing that it is fundamentally an ally motivated 
by the same objectives as the united States. The United States should continue to 








　Reischauer’s  new and strong relations with the Kennedys promised ever grater 
rewards and possibly greater influence over U.S. policy within the administration 
regarding Japan.  In December 1962, the second cabinet-level conference on economics 
and trade took place in Williamsburg, Virginia, further advancing the“growing sense 





















































































太平洋時代の交渉力」1989 年９月 20 日、京王プラザホテル札幌、日本交渉学会主催）
　The world has, at least 
real ly ,  become one and we 
have to  have a great  sk i l l 
a t  n e g o t i a t i n g  w i t h  e a c h 















































































































































































３億 2000 万ドル。内訳は、アメリカから移管される資産の買取りに１億 7500 万ドル、基
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